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EMBARGOES ON EXPORTS OF IDEAS AND
INFORMATION: A REPLY TO THE COMMENTS
ROBERT D. KAMENSHINE
I. ASKING WHETHER FIRST AMENDMENT VALUEs APPLY

It is surprising that Professor Redish and General Counsel Rindskopf find virtually sacreligious the discussion of whether first
amendment values apply to export of scientific and technological
information. If a "speech is speech" approach answers all, then recent commentary on first amendment values, including that of
Professor Redish, is irrelevant. It is unlikely that this is being suggested. Rather, both commentators are offended by what they regard as advocacy of an improper allocation of burden of proof. But
this misconceives the thrust of my discussion.
The proper question is whether there is anything about dissemination of scientific and technological information to foreign recipients sufficiently distinct to warrant a theoretical inquiry into the
applicability of first amendment values. There is no doubt that the
information communicated is "speech." The article simply entertains the hypothesis that here the dissemination of such "speech"
may not advance the values customarily discussed.
Normally, of course, there is a valid presumption that such values are furthered if the communication qualifies as "speech." Perhaps the commentators' bemoaning an alleged lack of respect for
the first amendment simply reflects their view that prima facie,
nothing about foreign dissemination of "speech" suggests that the
presumption might be inoperative. This is a legitimate difference
in perception. However, neither commentator seriously questions
the specifics of the values analysis once undertaken. General Counsel Rindskopf, however, does argue that the purely foreign versus
mixed foreign-domestic dissemination line often will be unclear.
The article acknowledges this but points out the categories of cases
where the distinction is reasonably workable-dissemination to a
particular foreign person, government or corporation.
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II. THE ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS

My alternative analysis of the first amendment as primarily an
anti-mind control instrument is no more conclusively provable
than Professor Redish's self-realization position. But the antimind
control analysis, by not virtually equating any detriment to speech
with a violation, does offer a more sensible comprehensive rationale for first amendment interpretation. Rather than arguing over
the various benefits which may derive from freedom of speech, as
he and others have done, the analysis addresses the first amendment's role as a restraint on government power. It views the
amendment within the context of the entire constitution, particularly the other bill of rights guarantees, all of which reflect a concept of limited government.
The key question under the first amendment is: "What do we
fear from government regulation of speech?" If we focus on all the
identifiable benefits which speech produces, i.e., self-realization,
then certainly any governmental action which consequentially diminishes the quantity of available speech is highly suspect. However, this perspective is not in accord with the overall structure of
the Bill of Rights dealing with specific types of possible governmental abuses. As applied to the first amendment, this involves the
well known tendency of government to try to regulate speech for
the purpose of imposing its own views on the public. Freedom of
speech maintains freedom of thought, keeping the mind free of
government manipulation. It is this function rather than maintenance of a particular quantity of speech, no matter how beneficial,
that ensures governmental respect for the dignity of the individual.
The commentators, however, erroneously perceive my analysis as
seriously reducing existing first amendment protection. Moreover,
Professor Redish talks about the logical fallacy of equating that
which is necessary to produce a result-a given scope of first
amendment protection-with that which also is sufficient. However, there can be such a fallacy only if we agree on what the resulting scope of protection should be and if he is correct in claiming that the protection cannot be obtained absent a broader
theoretical foundation. Neither of the prerequisites is fully satisfied here.
The alternative analysis supports a high level of protection, i.e.,
strict review, against almost all regulation of speech, including ar-
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eas where current Supreme Court doctrine either affords no protection (obscenity) or applies a reduced level of protection (commercial speech). Putting aside the commentators' rhetorical
flourishes praising the first amendment, the precise disagreement
here is whether the normal high level of protection should be applied to all regulation of scientific and technological expression. I
advocate strict review of regulation aimed at distorting the progress of scientific inquiry or the course of discussion on matters of
public policy. Further, I support strict review if the regulation has
the effect of distorting debate on public issues. As the Article
notes,' I did not discuss the application of strict review to legitimate national security regulation because this important topic had
been adequately dealt with by others.
Therefore the important difference of opinion between Professor
Redish and me pertains to regulation of scientific and technological speech where neither the purpose nor the effect criterion is satisfied. He continues to apply strict review, while I recommend a
rational basis level of scrutiny. The difference with General Counsel Rindskopf is less clear. She alone accepts the dichotomy between commercial and other forms of speech. Under her analysis,
scientific or technological material may start out as "noncommercial" but gradually metamorphose into "commercial" and therefore
eventually qualify for less protection. This makes it difficult to say
whether her position is more or less speech protective than mine.
III.

WHY THE SPECIAL CONCERN FOR ADVERSE POLITICAL EFFECT?

Where the government seeks to keep scientific or technological
information out of hostile hands it acts for a legitimate purpose,
one consistent with the first amendment. However, under the
amendment there is still a serious question as to the significance of
the regulation's adverse effect first, on advancement of science and
second, on public decisionmaking. The article evokes controversy
by differentiating between these two effects, attaching little freedom of speech significance to the first and predicating strict review
on the second. While the commentators suggest this is in line with
Judge Bork's position, the political-nonpolitical dichotomy is im1. See Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information: First Amendment
Issues, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 880 n.75 and accompanying text (1985).
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portant here only as to regulation of scientific and technological
speech. It is not, as Judge Bork argues, a basis for limiting first
amendment protection to speech in the political process.
A. Adverse PoliticalEffect as a Basis for Inferring Illicit Purpose
Confining strict review to regulation suppressing scientific or
technological information bearing on public issues comports with
the article's emphasis on legitimate regulatory purpose. Neither
commentator challenges the conclusion that government tends to
stifle information discrediting its public position but has no comparable inclination to censor scientific debate for nonpolitical reasons. Therefore it is sensible to presume illicit purpose from governmental suppression only where the material relates to public
issues.
There is, however, Professor Redish's criticism that it would be
difficult to determine which material relates to a public policy issue. Further, he is uncomfortable with the courts, as government
agencies, making this finding. In a sense this is a strange criticism
since every day, courts make subtle judgments on the scope of first
amendment rights. The real question is whether this particular
category of decisionmaking is appropriate. His fear is that either
an imprecise definition of "public policy issue" or a court's possible
excessive sensitivity to national security needs will produce unwarranted holdings favoring suppression.
The concept of speech "on matters of public concern" or on
"public issues" is well known in first amendment law. This was
most recently summarized in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.,2 just decided by the Supreme Court at the end of
the 1984 term. The Pentagon Papers3 case, a "national security"
case not involving scientific or technological material, is an excellent example of a judicially thwarted attempt to suppress information relevant to a public issue 4 -the legitimacy of United States
involvement in the Vietnam war.

2. 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2945-46 (1985).
3. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
4. For a discussion of a related problem pertaining to the scope of first amendment restraints on government speech, see Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CALip. L. REV. 1104, 1113-15 (1979).
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Nevertheless, there is merit to Professor Redish's concerns. Respect for the first amendment does require that strict review be
applied to suppression of material that is even rationallyrelated to
what arguably is a public issue. In other words, there should be
only a low burden on the party asserting that the case is a proper
one for strict review. Admittedly, however, a legal standard, no
matter how favorable to a constitutional guarantee, whether the
first amendment or any other, cannot alone ensure a high level of
protection. It cannot eliminate the human factor. But his problem
is faced whenever an individual rights issue is litigated. It is not
peculiar here.
B. Adverse Political Effect and the Paramount Nature of the
Democratic Process
The second basis for requiring strict review of regulations having
an adverse political effect is the threat such effect poses to the
democratic process. Here I admittedly rely on an identified paramount constitutional value. This troubles Professor Redish. He
asks why speech's contribution to the democratic process, which he
regards as simply an outgrowth of the first amendment's unitary
self-realization value, should be given primacy.
The first amendment facilitates the democratic process but that
process, which antedates the amendment, is itself a distinct fundamental constitutional value. It transcends the amendment's specifics and is basic to our constitutional structure. That structure provides the means by which our society confers power on public
officials and checks their abuse of power once it has been obtained.
Therefore strict review of any regulation which may damage the
democratic process, whether or not that regulation limits speech, is
singularly justified.5 Thus the fact that the government may have
entirely proper objectives in suppressing scientific and technological information should not immunize the suppression from strict
scrutiny where the ability to understand and debate a public issue
may be impaired.
5. J. ELY,

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

73-77, 105 (1980).
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C. Content Discriminationand the Problem of the Total Ban on
Speech
The emphasis of the alternative analysis on mind control and
the special concern with politically discriminatory effect triggers
Professor Redish's restatement of his attack on the "content distinction in first amendment analysis." He makes the irrefutable
observation that a total ban on speech-one involving no content
distinction-suppresses more speech than does a more narrowly
tailored regulation. He argues from his self-realization premise
that a "total ban" type regulation therefore needs scrutiny at least
as close as a more limited regulation.
Assuming that the central thrust of the first amendment is antimind manipulation rather than self-realization, how does this affect the analysis of a total ban? Professor Redish's impression is
that the result would be completely different since such a ban involves no element of viewpoint distortion. However, the actual difference is not that great.
Consider a bit more realistic hypothetical than Professor Redish's ban on "anyone saying anything about anything." Suppose
there were a total ban on speech in the public streets and parks.
The Supreme Court has categorized these types of governmental
property as traditional public forums in which the right of free
speech, particularly political dissent, has been historically exercised. A sudden governmental move to cut off all expression in
such places would be highly suspect no matter what plausible objective-noise pollution, litter prevention, etc.-the government
cited. While, on the surface this would be a neutral government
act, experience suggests a high likelihood of an impermissible governmental purpose to suppress certain ideas. This inference is buttressed by the usual availability of less restrictive means of obtaining the stated legitimate objective.
Such bans, even if unrelated to the exercise of free speech in a
traditional public forum, also would be suspect. For example, what
if the government outlawed all private mass media, leaving government media as the only source of news on matters of public concern. Again, an illicit purpose would be likely.6 Moreover, there

6. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3454-55 (1985)
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would be a politically discriminatory effect assuming only official
government viewpoints were disseminated. Thus Professor Redish's total bans concern is answered not by reliance on an admitted
detriment to self-realization, but by the probability that such bans
stem from objectives inconsistent with the first amendment's antimind control thrust.
As for Professor Redish's "don't step on the flowers" type regulation, there is less reason to suspect an improper governmental
objective. However, additional factors radically could transform
this picture. These factors are: (1) actual evidence of improper
purpose, (2) selective enforcement of the regulation, or (3) evidence that in practical effect the regulation tended to thwart the
expression of particular idea. An example, discussed at the symposium by Professor Schauer, is the embargo on importation of
Cuban products into the United States. These products range from
cigars to books, magazines, and newspapers. If there is no evidence
of a purpose to suppress particular ideas emanating from Cuba and
the enforcement of the ban is evenhanded, the only remaining line
of inquiry would relate to its possible effect. Assuming that
whatever unpopular political ideas there might be in Cuban publications could enter the country as long as the physical product
were produced elsewhere, the USSR for example, there would be
no serious first amendment problem.

(Supreme Court remanded a first amendment case for inquiry into the government's
purpose).

